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Toner: Water Law - Primary Jurisdiction of the Board of Control over Que

CASE NOTE
WATER LAW-Primary Jurisdiction of the Board of Control over Questions of
Water Rights. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet
Reservoir Co., 487 P.2d 324 (Wyo. 1971).*

Kearney Lake, Land and Reservoir Company brought
an action in district court to have part of the water rights of
the Lake DeSmet Reservoir Company declared abandoned.
On the first hearing before the Wyoming Supreme Court,
the district court's dismissal of the complaint was sustained
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.' In upholding the district
court, the Wyoming Supreme Court also indicated that the
plaintiff should have initiated the abandonment proceedings
before the Board of Control.2
A rehearing was granted in order to specifically decide
the issue of whether questions of abandonment of water
rights must be initially determined by the Board of Control.
The plaintiff contended that the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Board and may continue to initially determine abandonment questions. Defendant contended that
the Board had exclusive jurisdiction in this area. The court
held that the Board of Control has primary jurisdiction over
questions of abandonment of water rights.' This meant that
while the Board and the courts still have concurrent jurisdiction over abandonment questions, before the district court
will grant relief, the abandonment issue should be initially
determined by the Board.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Kearney case the court stated that the relationship
between the Board and the courts in cases involving abandon*This case note was partially financed by the Water Resources Research Institute of the University of Wyoming.
1. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 475
P.2d 548 (Wyo. 1970).
2. Id. at 549-50.
3. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 487
P.2d 324, 328 (1971). Primary jurisdiction is also commonly referred to
as prior resort. 2

COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW 562 (1965).
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ment was in an "intolerable situation." ' The Wyoming
Statutes provide a procedure for obtaining a declaration of
abandonment of water rights." Section 41-48 provides that a
water user seeking a declaration of abandonment "shall present his case in writing to the board of control." 6 It had been
contended prior to Kearney that this statute deprived the
courts of jurisdiction and vested exclusive jurisdiction over
abandonment of water rights in the Board.! This contention
was rejected, but it was held that if the Board initially decided an abandonment question, that decision was final and
binding on the parties unless the decision was appealed to
the courts
In Louth v. Kaser the court clearly held that the statutory procedure for determining abandonment was not exclusive and that the courts had concurrent jurisdiction to decide the question of abandonment in private litigation. While
the Louth decision gave the contestant a choice of forums, it
also gave an indication of things to come for the court
quoted Laramie Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur ° to support the
proposition that it would be desirable to have abandonment
proceedings initially handled by the Board.1 In Wheatland
Irrigation District v. Pioneer Canal Co. 2 the court again
took up this theme and stressed the particular knowledge
and expertise of the Board in dealing with the technicalities
involved in abandonment questions. Against this background
the Kearney designation of primary jurisdiction in the Board
4. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., 487
P.2d 324, 326 (Wyo. 1971).
5. WYo. STAT. §§ 41-47 to -53 (1957).
6. WYo. STAT. § 41-48 (1957).
7. This contention was made in Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925).
8. Id. at 767.
9. 364 P.2d 96 (Wyo. 1961).
10. 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949).
11. Louth v. Kaser, supra note 9, at 101.
12. 464 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1970). This case also brings up a point which may
have been significant in influencing the courts to continue to hold that
there is concurrent jurisdiction and to continue to allow these proceedings
to be initiated in the courts. Prior to the enactment of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, the Board of Control lacked the power to
grant discovery to the parties, while the court could grant this pre-trial
procedure. Regardless of the board's expertise, if the parties could not
adequately develop their cases because of a lack of access to needed information, nothing would be gained by forcing them to go before the Board.
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of Control appears to have been the only means of reconciling
the holdings of concurrent jurisdiction with the court's desire
to have abandonment issues initially determined by the
Board.
II.

INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS

The Board's primary jurisdiction means that the district court (if in the exercise of its discretion, it finds that
it is necessary) will require the plaintiff first to seek relief
before the Board and will allow the Board to initially determine the question. This limits the choices which the Louth
case gave the plaintiff. An action for a declaration of abandonment of water rights can apparently be initiated in the
courts. The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, indicated
disapproval of such a proceeding when the sole or principal
relief sought was a declaration of abandonment. Yet it felt
that dismissal of the action would be inconsistent with its
holdings of concurrent jurisdiction."
An abandonment proceeding can still be initiated before
the Board. Section 41-48 of the Wyoming Statutes still provides for this procedure, and nothing in the court's decision
indicated disapproval of the procedure followed in the abandonment cases which reached the court before the Kearney
decision. In those cases the proceedings were usually initiated before the Board. 4 As previously noted, the court seems
to recommend this procedure when abandonment is the sole
or principal issue involved in a dispute.
13. Kearney Lake. Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4. at 328. The question of dismissal or stay of the action may be more
complicated than the court indicates. In applying primary jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld dismissal when the court could
not grant relief regardless of the agency's action and when no purpose
would be served by a stay because a similar suit could be instituted at a
later time. E.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) ;
Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). In other cases the
court has upheld a stay, especially when the agency could not grant the
relief sought. E.g., Gen. Am. Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co.,
808 U.S. 422 (1940).
14. Wheatland Irrigation District v. Pioneer Canal Co., supra note 12; Yentzer
v. Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 1968); Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 371 (Wyo.
1960); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320,
92 P.2d 572 (1939); Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937).
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III. DISTRICT COUIT DISCRETION
The discretion of the district court in deciding whether
or not to apply this doctrine of primary jurisdiction is an
important aspect of this case. The court did set down certain
guidelines in order to aid the district court in the exercise of
its discretion. They quoted with approval a statement from
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.15 that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should be applied when the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and the
purposes which the doctrine serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.
The court stated that the reasons for and purposes of the
doctrine are to correlate the functions of the court and the
Board in order to provide uniformity in decisions, to utilize
the expertise of the Board"5 and to bring about an "orderly
and desired procedure." 1 7 It seems that these reasons would
often be present in an abandonment proceeding. The plaintiff or contestant must show that the defendant or contestee
failed to use the water for beneficial purposes for five successive years ;18 that the contestant is an owner of an appropriation of water that would be appreciably benefited by a declaration of abandonment,1 9 and that, while intent is not necessary for an abandonment of water rights, 9 the abandonment
must be effected by a voluntary act. 1 In order to prove that
the defendant failed to use the water for five years2 2 or that
the plaintiff would not be benefited by a declaration of aban4
donment," rather technical evidence is often introduced.
Where these technicalities are involved, a more efficient eval15. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
16. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4, at 325.
17. Id. at 326.
18. WYO. STAT. § 41-47 (1957).
19. Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v. Lincoln Land Co., 54 Wyo. 320, 92 P.2d
572 (1939).
20. Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1960).
21. Ramsay v. Gottsche, 51 Wyo. 516, 69 P.2d 535 (1937); TRELEASE, BLOOMENTHAL & GERAUD, CASES & MATERIALS ON NATURAL RESOURCES 157 (1965).
22. This issue was raised and technical evidence was presented in Wheatland
Irrigation Dist. v. Pioneer Canal Co., supra note 12.
23. This issue was raised and technical evidence was presented in Yentzer v.
Hemenway, 440 P.2d 7 (Wyo. 1968).
24. This evidence includes the testimony of engineers and aerial photos which
are examined for variance in color in order to determine if the land has
been irrigated. See notes 22 and 23, supra.
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uation of the evidence might be obtained by certifying the
question to the Board. This would save the time which would
otherwise have to be devoted to educating the court so that
the significance of the evidence could be understood. If the
Board handles the question, it would be unnecessary to present information which forms part of the basis of the expert's
knowledge but which is new and strange to those outside the
field. In addition, by referring these issues to the Board in
most instances, the court will be establishing a systematic
method of fact finding which should lead to the uniformity
and the orderly procedure that the court desires.
The court also indicated that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "factual issue(s)" will be certified to the
Board." This seems to constitute a further limitation on
the district court's discretion, and it is in accord with the
general rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction has
no application where solely a question of law is involved.2"
Another factor, which was not mentioned by the Wyoming court but which has been recognized by other courts,
in determining whether to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine is whether the agency is competent or has the power
to grant the relief sought by the parties.2" This factor will
probably seldom create any difficulties where abandonment
is involved. Whether the plaintiff goes before the court or
the Board, he will be seeking a declaration of abandonment,
and the Board is competent to grant this relief."
In exercising its discretion, it has also been recommended
that the court determine whether the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine will impose too great a burden on
25. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4, at 328.
26. United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 852 U.S. 59 (1956); Great Northern R.R.
v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922); 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 569 (1965).
27. Morris v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Jefferson County, 150 Colo. 33, 370
P.2d 438 (1962); Oliver v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa
1971); Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.
1968); 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 570 (1965).
28. WYO. STAT. § 41-50 (1957). This statute states that the Board may declare
the rights abandoned.
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the litigants in terms of expense and delay. 9 The Wyoming
court indicated, however, that it felt there would be little or
no additional expense to the litigants because of this procedure and that any additional delay was justified by the
advantages of establishing an orderly procedure.
The essence of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is the
development of an orderly and sensible coordination of the
work of the agencies and the courts." In order to achieve
this coordination and to prevent primary jurisdiction from
becoming simply "an automatic judicial response to an abstraction labeled 'expertise',""' the district court must engage
in a balancing of these different factors. Slavish adherence
to the doctrine without this evaluation would defeat the goal
of establishing a proper and viable relationship between the
court and the Board.
IV.

CERTIFICATION TO TE

BoAmD

Once the question is certified to the Board, a new rule
adopted by the State Engineer and the Board of Control pursuant to the Supreme Court's instructions in the Kearney
case provides that the parties are to proceed with the matter
as though it had been originally instituted before the Board."2
The rules governing disputes originally instituted before the
Board provide that the plaintiff or contestant must present
a petition for a declaration of abandonment to the Board."
The procedure for making a determination of abandonment
is generally that set out by Wyoming Statutes, Sections 41-48
to -52. These provide that, if necessary, the Board will refer
the matter to a division superintendent who shall conduct a
hearing, take evidence, and report to the Board. The Board
shall then conduct a final hearing where additional evidence
29. Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926); Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y.
1969); Jaffee, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws,
102 U. PA. L.R. 577, 592 (1954); Note, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: A Reexamination of its Purpose and Practicality, 48 GEo. L.J. 563,
573, (1960).
30. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATrvE LAW TEXT § 19.01 at 374 (3d ed. 1972).
31. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws, 102
U. PA. L.R. 577, 603 (1954).
32. State Engineer, Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming State Engineer's
Office, pt. III, ch. VII, § 1 (1971) [Hereinafter cited as Regs.].
33. Regs., pt. III, ch. V, § 7a.
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may be presented." The rules of practice in these proceedings are provided for in the Board's regulations."
The new rule provides that the Board shall then make a
written decision and order containing findings of fact and
conclusions of law. If the district court's order so requires,
the Board's decision, order, and record of its hearings will
be certified to the court. If the court's order does not expressly require certification, then judicial review of the
order is to be governed by Rule 72.1 of the Wyoming Rules
of Civil Procedure.8
V.

REVIEW BY THE COURT

In the Kearney case the Wyoming Supreme Court provided that the district court's review of the Board's proceedings is to be governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Section 9-276.32"T and by Rule 72.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.8 The statute and the rule
restrict review of the Board's action to a determination of
whether or not
(1) [t]he agency acted without or in excess of its
powers;
(2) the decision or other agency action was procured
by fraud;
(3) the decision or other agency action is in conformity with the law;
(4) the findings of fact in issue in a contested case
are supported by substantial evidence; and
(5) the decision or other agency action is arbitrary,
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion."
The review is also limited to the record made before the
Board and supplemental evidence which may be introduced
if it is shown that the evidence is material and that there was
a good reason for failing to present it before the Board.4
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

WYo.
Regs.,
Regs.,
WYo.
Wyo.
WYO.

§ 41-48 to -52 (1957).
pt. III, ch. VI, §§ 1 to 26.
pt. III, ch. VII, § 3.
STAT. § 9-276.32 (Supp. 1971).
R. CIrv. P. 72.1.
STAT. § 9-276.32(c) (Supp. 1971).
STAT.

40. Wyo. R. Civ. P. 72.1(h) (i).
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It appears that the scope of judicial review of the
Board's proceedings is not influenced by the manner in which
the question comes to the Board. If the abandonment proceeding was initiated before the Board or if the action was
originally dismissed by the court,4 the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act would clearly govern any judicial
review. If the question is certified to the Board, it appears
that for the purpose of review the Board's answer has the
same status as a decision in a proceeding initiated before
the Board. The certification proceedings seem to fit the
description of a reviewable agency action under the Act. It
is a "final decision of an agency in a contested case."4 The
court also indicated that this is more than just an advisory
opinion which the court could disregard because the Board's
decision is not reviewed unless a party requests the court to
do so."
The Wyoming Statute, Section 41-53, which provided for
a trial de novo by the district court on the Board's decision
in abandonment cases, is now superseded by the Act and the
rules adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court.4 Section
9-276.32(b) provides that the rules adopted by the court
under the provisions of the Act which relate to judicial review by the district courts may supersede existing statutory
provisions. 5 Pursuant to this statute, the court adopted
Rule 87(b) which provides that all statutory procedures relating to procedure on appeal from or review of administrative action are superseded." Rule 72.1 states that all ap41. As was indicated, dismissal is unlikely n these cases.
42. WYO. STAT. § 9-276.32(a) (Supp. 1971).
43. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4, at 328.
44. Section 9-276.32 (b) may raise an issue of unconstitutional delegation of the
legislative power to repeal statutes to the judiciary. This issue is beyond
the scope of this note; however, it seems unlikely that the court would now
declare that it had no power to apply a rule which it has used in several
cases in addition to Kearney. See Thornley v. Wyo. Highway Dep't, 478
P.2d 600 (Wyo. 1971); City of Casper v. Regan, 433 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1967).
In addition, courts have been allowed to supersede existing procedural
statutes by the enactment of rules of procedure. Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz.
360, 129 P.2d 308 (1942). There may be a dispute over whether the scope
of review is a matter of procedural or substantive law. However, administrative repeal of substantive legislative enactments by the adoption of administrative regulation has been held to be constitutional. 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2024 (1943).
(Supp. 1971).
45. WYO. STAT § 9-276.32(b)
46. WYo. R. Civ. P. 87(b).
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peals from administrative agencies and all proceedings for
trial de novo reviewing administrative action shall be governed by Rule 72.1."
If Section 9-276.32 and Rule 72.1 did not supersede Section 41-53, a rather anomalous procedure might exist as a
result of the Kearney case. If a proceeding for a declaration
of abandonment was initiated in the Board of Control, upon
review the district court might have been able to hold a trial
de novo on the issue under Section 41-53; while if the action
was initiated in the courts and certified to the Board, review
would have been limited by the more restrictive procedures
of Section 9-276.32 and Rule 72.1.48
VI. IMPACT ON OTHER AREAS OF WATER LAW

The Kearney decision may also have implications for the
relationship between the courts and the administrative agencies in other areas of water law. The court stated that the
decision might have an impact on the future but that their
present concern was the relationship between the courts
and the Board in cases involving the issue of abandonment. 9
There are indications, however, that the decision may eventu47. In Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Pioneer Canal Co. the court indicated
that section 9-276.32 and Rule 72.1 do supersede section 41-53. The court
had to decide whether the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act or
section 41-53 applied to the action; thus indicating that the two procedures
are mutually exclusive. The court held that section 41-53 governed the
appeal in this case and that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
did not apply because this was a "pending" proceeding at the time the
Act became effective in 1966. Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. Pioneer Canal
Co., supra note 12.
48. This difference would perhaps not be significant if the courts adopted
the rather restrictive interpretation given trial de novo in the cases involving review of the decisions of the Board of Land Commissioners. These
cases required the court to uphold the Board's findings if they were based
on substantial evidence and no fraud, illegality, or abuse of discretion was
shown. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Hudson, 348 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1960); Rayburne v. Queen, 76 Wyo. 393, 303 P.2d 486 (1956). There are, however,
indications that a trial de novo under section 41-53 was not so limited and
that the trial court was actually in error if it limited itself to a review of
the record made before the Board of Control. Wheatland Irrigation Dist.
v. Pioneer Canal Co., 464 P.2d 533 (Wyo. 1970). In addition, under this
statute the district court was the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses
and was entitled to interpret the evidence. Ward v. Yoder, 355 P.2d 370
(Wyo. 1960). Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, however, a trial do novo is given a restricted meaning, and the court cannot redetermine all of the facts and substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
City of Casper v. Regan, 433 P.2d 834 (Wyo. 1967).
49. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4, at 326.
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ally be expanded into other areas. In outlining the procedure
to be followed in certifying a question to the Board, the
court stated that the Board should adopt rules "whereby
upon certification to the board by the district court of a
factual issue, such as abandonment," the Board could proceed to determine the issue." This language seems to indicate that the questions which may in the future be certified
to the Board are not limited solely to abandonment issues.
In addition, the new rule adopted by the Board of Control and the State Engineer is broadly phrased and provides:
If a District Court determines that the Board of
Control is to have primary jurisdiction to make the
initial determination of a question involving the
waters of the State of Wyoming, and their appropriation, distribution, and diversion, the Board of
Control shall assume jurisdiction and shall hear and
decide such question upon its certification to the
Board by the District Court."
This broad phrasing may be an additional indication of a
willingness to expand the principle of primary jurisdiction
into other areas, which will be discussed below.
A. Adjudication of Priorities
As in the case of abandonment proceedings, the courts
and the Board have been held to have concurrent jurisdiction
to adjudicate priorities of water rights, 2 and, as in the
abandonment cases, the Board of Control's adjudication of
water rights is final and binding upon any collateral attack."8
In Simmons v. Ramsbottom the court stated that one of the
reasons for the holding of concurrent jurisdiction was that
in the Board's formative period it was faced with a large
amount of work, few adjudications of priorities had been
made, and the Board was hampered by limited appropria50. Id. at 328.
51. Regs., pt. III, ch. VII, § 1.
52. Anita Ditch Co. v. Turner, 389 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1964); Laramie Rivers
Co. v. Le Vasseur, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949); Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153 (1937); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
53. Campbell v. Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940);
TRELEASE, supra note 21, at 169.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol7/iss2/11

10

Toner: Water Law - Primary Jurisdiction of the Board of Control over Que

1972

CASE NoT6

609

tions." In other words, if the courts did not adjudicate priorities, no other agency could. The legislature certainly did
not intend that result. This reason for concurrent jurisdiction is no longer convincing. On the other hand, the reasons
of uniformity, expertise, and orderly procedure appear to be
as applicable to the adjudication of priorities as they are to
abandonment. For example, the technicalities involved in
priority cases, which might be better understood by administrative experts, have been recognized by the Wyoming Supreme Court on several occasions."
In addition, the factors of whether the dispute involves
solely a question of law and of expense and delay do not seem
to be significantly different from the abandonment cases. A
problem may arise in the adjudication of priorities over the
agency's competency to grant the relief requested by the
parties. In the courts, these actions usually take the form
of an action for a declaratory judgment or an action to quiet
title. The remedy which the Board can give is a final order
of adjudication that sets forth the date of priority, the
amount of water appropriated, and the character of use;"
this order is conclusive on all the claimants on the stream to
which the adjudication relates. 7 This appears to give the
Board the power to grant the relief which the party requests.
It would seem, therefore, that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should also be applied in this area.
B. Distribution of Water
Section 41-64 of the Wyoming Statutes provides that
the water commissioner is to regulate and divide the water
of his district according to the priority of each user.58 In
Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land d Livestock Co. the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a water user could sue for
damages or an injunction without first calling on the water
54. Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 430-31, 68 P.2d 153, 156 (1937).
55. Laramie Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 65 Wyo. 414, 202 P.2d 680 (1949);
Ryan v. Tutty, 13 Wyo. 122, 78 P. 661 (1904); Farm Investment Co. v.
Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
56. WYO. STAT. § 41-181 (1957).
57. WYO. STAT. § 41-190 (1957).
58. Wyo. STAT. § 41-64 (1957).
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commissioner to regulate the ditch.5" This indicates that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to a suit for
damages for wrongful diversion of water.
Wrongful diversion questions may involve technical
problems and call for expertise; an orderly procedure might
result from the application of the doctrine. It seems, however, that the impact which the Kearney case will have on
Van Buskirk will depend largely on the weight which the
court gives to the factor of the inadequacy of the administrative remedy.
By regulating the ditch the water commissioner could
stop the wrongful diversions and prevent them in the future.
This would perform many of the functions of an injunction
which a court could issue. The water commissioner and the
Board of Control cannot, however, award damages in order
to compensate the plaintiff for the defendant's actions. If
the plaintiff is seeking damages, it may seem futile to require him to go first to the water commissioner. In the case
of a declaration of abandonment or an adjudication of priorities, the effect of an order of the Board is much the same as
a judgment or order of the court. This is not true in a suit
for damages, and some courts have seized upon the inability
of an administrative agency to award damages as a means
of avoiding the primary jurisdiction doctrine."
It may be desirable to get administrative advice on the
question of whether there was a wrongful diversion; this may
be done by forcing the plaintiff to first take advantage of
the administrative remedies available to him. The Supreme
Court of Texas has limited the application of the rule of
inadequate administrative remedy to those situations where
the administrative agency is powerless to grant the relief
sought and the agency has no authority to make incidental
findings which are essential to granting the relief.6 In regulating the water, the water commissioner will divide the water
according to the priorities of the parties. In any contest
59. Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land and Livestock Co., 24 Wyo. 183, 156 P.
1122 (1916); TRELiASE, supra note 21, at 170.
60. E.g., Oliver v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 183 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1971).
61. Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1968).
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arising out of the commissioner's action, the issue of whether
one of the parties was wrongfully diverting water would,
therefore, be resolved. A finding of wrongful diversion is,
of course, essential to an award of damages. Thus it would
be possible for a court which adopted the Texas approach
to find that the inadequacy of administrative remedy does
not militate against the application of the doctrine.
If a plaintiff is required first to go to the water commissioner to ask for relief in which the plaintiff is not primarily interested, the elements of expense and delay seem to
play a more important role. If the party wishes to appeal
from a commissioner's action or inaction, he has a right to
appeal to the division superintendent and from his decision
to the state engineer and finally to the district court.62 The
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
administrative remedies be exhausted before a party is entitled to judicial review. 3 An aggrieved party would probably
have to exhaust all of the administrative avenues open to him.
This procedure may aid the district court in sorting out the
facts of a wrongful diversion, but the important point is
that the entire procedure would only decide the question of
whether the water commissioner erred in regulating and dividing the water. The plaintiff is seeking damages.
It must be remembered that the inadequacy of the administrative remedy is only one factor in the determination
of whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will be applied. Given the Van Buskirk decision, the rather lengthy
administrative proceedings, and the Board's inability to
grant the relief requested, it seems that the Kearney case will
probably not inject the primary jurisdiction doctrine into
a damage suit for wrongful diversion.
C. Joint Ditches.
The Wyoming Statutes provide that when joint owners
of a ditch or reservoir dispute over the distribution of water,
the owners may apply to the water commissioner to divide
62. WYo. STAT. § 41-63 (Supp. 1971).
63. Wyo. STAT. § 9-276.32(a) (Supp. 1971).
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the water." A forerunner of this statute" was involved in
Stoner v. Mau." In that case the court held that the statutory
remedy was not exclusive and allowed the plaintiff to sue for
damages and an injunction even though he had not requested
an appointment of a person to distribute the water.
If the plaintiff is merely seeking injunctive relief, the
remedy which the water commissioner could grant would
seem as adequate as an injunction because the commissioner
is empowered to divide the water according to the parties'
rights and is to continue this work until its necessity ceases."
Accepting the statement in Stoner v. Mau that this statute
did not deprive the court of its equitable jurisdiction in this
area, it still seems that, given the commissioner's ability to
prevent wrongful diversion, the factor of inadequate administrative remedy should not work against the application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine. If, however, the action is for
damages for the wrongful taking of water, the reasons advanced against the application of the doctrine in the area
of suits for wrongful diversion of water would again apply.
The inadequacy of the administrative remedy would again
work against the doctrine's application.
VII. CONCLUSION

One of the much proclaimed advantages of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is its flexibility." This flexibility
should be attained by committing to the district court the decision of whether to apply the doctrine. This discretion
should, however, not be exercised arbitrarily. Rather, in
order to achieve this orderly and desired procedure and the
coordination between the courts and the Board, it should be
64. WYO. STAT. § 41-252 (1957).
65. Laws of March 1, 1897, ch. 68 § 1, [1897] Wyo. Laws 123. This statute
provided that when joint owners of an irrigation ditch were unable to
agree on the division or distribution of water received through the ditch,
either of the owners could apply to the district court for an order appointing a suitable person to take charge of the ditch for the purpose of making
a just distribution.
66. 11 Wyo. 360, 72 P. 193 (1903).
67. WYo. STAT. § 41-252 (1957).
68. McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders,
28 CAUi. L. REv. 129, 154 (1940).
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exercised within the limits of the guidelines set down by the
Wyoming Supreme Court.
The court indicated that the expertise of the Board and
uniformity in decisions were among the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion. 9 Thus, if the factual
situation presented by a case is particularly complex and if
the district court is confronted with much technical evidence,
the application of the doctrine can assist the court in understanding the evidence. If the principal or sole issue presented
by the case is one of abandonment, the Wyoming Supreme
Court indicated that the proceedings should be initiated before the Board, and, if not, the district court should certify
the question to the Board." This would achieve the desired
uniformity of decision and a sensible coordination between
the courts and the Board.
Another factor to be considered in the attempt to achieve
this orderly and sensible coordination of efforts would be
whether the question presented is one of fact or solely one of
law. If solely one of law, a sensible procedure would not require referral of the question from an institution which is the
specialist in the area of law, the district court. In addition,
the problems of expense and delay should always be given
weight in determining whether to apply the doctrine. Finally,
if the Board cannot grant the relief requested, there would
seem to be a serious question regarding the degree of order
and sense inherent in a system which would blindly require
referral to the Board of all questions in the area.
Speculating on the possibility of the expansion of this
doctrine into other areas of water law, it seems that the
striking similarities in the development of the law of adjudication of water rights and the development of the law of
abandonment may indicate that this doctrine will be carried
over into the adjudication area.7 In the areas of distribu69. Kearney Lake, Land & Reservoir Co. v. Lake DeSmet Reservoir Co., supra
note 4, at 325.
70. Id. at 328.
71. The similarity can be seen in the holdings of (1) concurrent jurisdiction
in the Board and the courts and (2) the binding nature of the Board's
decision on collateral attack. Compare Louth v. Kaser, 364 P.2d 96 (Wyo.
1961) (abandonment); Simmons v. Ramsbottom, 51 Wyo. 419, 68 P.2d 153
(1937) (adjudication), with Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Pack-
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tion of water and disputes over water rights in joint ditches,
the expansion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine would
appear to be hindered by cases which seem to reject it. 2
Nonetheless, the arguments for the application of the doctrine in these cases seem to be particularly strong when injunctive relief is sought. When damages are requested, the
argument is considerably weakened. Even if the previous
cases are overruled or distinguished, when the remedy sought
is damages, there is a strong factor working against the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
THOMAS TONER

ing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925) (abandonment); Campbell v.
Wyoming Development Co., 55 Wyo. 347, 100 P.2d 124 (1940) (adjudication). Finally, in both instances the remedy which the parties are seeking
is a declaration that they either have or do not have a certain right.
72. Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land & Livestock Co., supra note 59 (wrongful
diversion of water); Stoner v. Mau, supra note 66 (joint ditches). The
statute involved in Stoner is not the same one that Wyoming now has, but
the reasoning of the case would also seem to apply to section 41-64 of the
Wyoming Statutes.
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